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TESTIMONY OF JOHN WARREN KINDT1
 
This Statement will address the following issue areas, as requested by the Committee. 
 
1. U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic  
    Impacts of Legalized Tribal Gambling Activities; 
2. Solutions: Transform Tribal Gambling Facilities into Educational and Practical   
    Technology Facilities; 
3. The Feeder Market Impacts of Tribal Casinos; 
4. Tribal Gambling Activities: The Issues Involving Market Saturation; and 
5. Are Tribal Games and Slots “Fair” to Patrons? 
  
In this testimony I have cited to my own work only as introductions to the 
hundreds of source materials cited in the footnotes.  These sources can be referenced by 
researchers.  This Committee has my permission (and the permissions which I have 
already received from the publishers of my articles and the attachments herein) to reprint 
and distribute any or all of the articles authored by myself on gambling issues. 
 
1. U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic  
    Impacts of Legalized Tribal Gambling Activities 
 
 During the 1990s, the international economic and diplomatic ramifications of the 
spread of U.S. gambling technologies throughout the United States and the world were 
outlined in an article written at the suggestion and under the auspices of former Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk.  The article was: John W. Kindt, U.S. Security and the Strategic 
Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 33 St. 
Louis U.L.J. 567-584 (1995), reprinted in National Gambling Impact and Policy 
Comm’n Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 519-27, 528-45 (1995). 
 U.S. tribal gambling issues are larger than myopically trying to help the selective 
impoverished.  The U.S. tribal model is being marketed around the world as economic 
development to Third World countries, but their economies just become poorer, and their 
infrastructures and financial institutions become destabilized. 
 As commonly utilized by U.S. State Department analysts, the McDougal/Lasswell 
methodology for policy-oriented decision-making highlights these strategic problems 
with the spread of U.S. gambling technologies.  See, e.g. John W. Kindt & Anne E.C. 
Brynn, Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism: Government-Sanctioned 
Gambling as Encouraging Transboundary Economic Raiding and Destabilizing National 
                                                 
1 Professor, Univ. Ill. at Urbana-Champaign.  B.A. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977,  U. Ga.; 
LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, U. Va.; Associate, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International 
Security, University of Illinois.  Professor Kindt has taught at the University of Illinois since 1978, and he 
has published over 70 academic articles in law reviews, public policy journals, and economics journals.  
Over 20 of these articles have dealt with gambling issues.  To avoid conflicts of interest, Professor Kindt 
and several academic colleagues do not accept consultant fees or honoraria for work in gambling research 
areas.  This Statement should be interpreted as representing only the individual views of the author.  Ann 
Mui provided valuable editorial assistance in preparing this Statement. 
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and International Economies, 16 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 243 (2002-03) (lead 
article). 
 
2. Solutions: Transform Tribal Gambling Facilities into Educational and Practical    
   Technology Facilities 
 
 Instead of legalizing a casino/slot machine establishment at a failing racetrack in 
1997, the Nebraska legislature bulldozed the racetrack and made it into an extension of 
the University of Nebraska and a high-tech office park.  John W. Kindt, Would Re-
Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the Economy and Could U.S. Gambling 
Facilities Be Transformed into Educational and High-Tech Facilities?  Will the Legal 
Discovery of Gambling Companies’ Secrets Confirm Research Issues?, 8 STANFORD J.L., 
BUS. & FIN. 169-212 (2003) (lead article). 
 Thereafter, as pro-gambling interests returned to Nebraska, they were repeatedly 
rebuffed by the academic community, which was exemplified in one instance by 40 
economists publicly rejecting new gambling proposals that would “cannibalize” the 
consumer economy.  Robert Dorr, 40 Economists Side Against More Gambling, Signers: 
Costs Likely Higher than Profits, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 22, 1996, at B1. 
 In a unanimous vote (except for one dissent by a representative from a casino 
district) on March 17, 2005, the Illinois House Government Affairs Committee favorably 
reported H.B. 1920 to the House for a vote to re-criminalize Illinois casinos. 
 Similarly, suggestions have been made to re-criminalize gambling facilities in 
other states and transform the gambling facilities into educational and high-tech assets – 
instead of giving the gambling industry tax breaks.  Casinos and gambling parlors would 
generally be compatible with transformations into educational and high-tech resources.  
For example, the hotels and dining facilities could be natural dormitory facilities.  
Historically, facilities built for short-term events, such as various World’s Fair 
Expositions, the 1996 Olympic Village (converted to facilities for the Georgia University 
system), and other public events have been transformed into educational and research 
facilities. 
 Given the allegations of misuse, non-accounting, and even malfeasance involving 
gambling revenues in Native American operations, various legislative personnel in the 
late 1990s considered potential legislation that would place Native American gambling 
revenues in trust for the benefit of all Native Americans, not just a few senior tribe 
members.  This policy was to be combined with the partial use of trust monies to convert 
Native American gambling facilities into educational, cultural, and business facilities.  
For a historical summary of issues, see Bruce Orwall, Gaming the System: The Federal 
Regulator of Indian Gambling is Also Part Advocate, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1996, at A1. 
 For concerns by the 1999 U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 
see, for example, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 7-9 (June 
1999).  “Again, the unwillingness of individual tribes as well as that of the National 
Indian Gaming Association (the tribes’ lobbyists) and the National Indian Gaming 
Commission, (the federal agency that regulates tribal gambling), to provide information 
to this Commission, after repeated requests and assurances of confidentiality, limited our 
assessment…” Id.  With only one dissenting vote by Commissioner Robert W. Loesher 
who was unduly protecting Native American gambling interests, the 1999 U.S. National 
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Gambling Impact Study Commission voted eight to one to subpoena information from 
the U.S. National Indian Gaming Commission in 1999.  However, use of its subpoena 
power was thereafter deemed largely ineffectual by the Commission and was not 
pursued. 
 
3. The Feeder Market Impacts of Tribal Casinos 
 
The Final Report of the Congressional 1999 National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission called for a moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling anywhere 
in the United States.  Although tactfully worded, the National Gambling Commission 
also called for the re-criminalization of various types of gambling, particularly slot 
machines convenient to the public. 
 Some of the negative impacts of casinos and slot machines are detailed in the 
appendix to the article, Diminishing Or Negating The Multiplier Effect: The Transfer of 
Consumer Dollars to Legalized Gambling: Should A Negative Socio-Economic “Crime 
Multiplier” be Included in Gambling Cost/Benefit Analyses?, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. 
REV. 281-313 (lead article).  The circle “feeder market” chart and sources documentation 
follow this written testimony. 
 The most authoritative and specific example involving tribal casinos is a 1995 
Wisconsin report which concluded that “[w]ithout considering the social costs of 
compulsive [addicted] gambling, the ‘rest-of-the-state’ areas lose-or, transfer in-$223.94 
million to the local gaming areas.  Considering the lowest estimated social costs of 
problem gambling, the rest of … [Wisconsin] loses $318.61 million to gambling.”  This 
report also concluded that without casino gambling, many local citizens would have 
increased participation in other “outside” activities.  “More than 10% of the locals would 
spend more on groceries if it were not for the casino, while nearly one-fourth would 
spend more on clothes.  Thirty-seven percent said that their savings had been reduced 
since the casino had opened…”  WILLIAM THOMPSON, RICARDO GAZEL, & DAN 
RICKMAN, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMBLING IN WISCONSIN (Wis. 
Policy Res. Inst. 1995). 
 From the business perspective, businesses are not naïve.  For example, “in a rare 
public stand on a controversial political issue, the Greater Washington Board of Trade’s 
85-member board voted unanimously against” Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly’s initiative to 
bring casino-style gambling to Washington, D.C.  Liz Spayd & Yolanda Woodlee, Trade 
Board Rejects D.C. Casino Plan, WASH. POST, Sept, 25, 1993, at A1, A8.  With the 
exception of the cluster services associated with gambling, new businesses tend not to 
locate in areas allowing legalized gambling because of one or more of the 
aforementioned costs. In areas saturated with legalized gambling activities, pre-existing 
businesses face added pressures that push them toward illiquidity and even bankruptcy. 
 
4. Tribal Gambling Activities: The Issues Involving Market Saturation 
 
 In his classic book entitled Economics, Nobel-Prize laureate Paul Samuelson 
summarized the economics involved in gambling activities as follows:  “There is … a 
substantial economic case to be made against gambling.  First, it involves simply sterile 
transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new money or goods.  
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Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources.  
When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose after all is to 
“kill” time, gambling subtracts from the national income.  The second economic 
disadvantage of gambling is the fact that it tends to promote inequality and instability of 
incomes.”  PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 245 (10th ed.).  Furthermore, Professor 
Samuelson observed that “[j]ust as Malthus saw the law of diminishing returns as 
underlying his theory of population, so is the ‘law of diminishing marginal utility’ used 
by many economists to condemn professional gambling.” Id. at  425. 
 The concern of the legalized gambling interests over “market saturation” is 
largely a non-issue.  From the governmental perspective, focusing on this issue misdirects 
the economic debate, because fears of market saturation are predicated upon the 
unwarranted assumption that legalized gambling operations constitute regional economic 
development—which they do not.  In reality, legalized gambling operations consist 
primarily of a transfer of wealth from the many to the few—accompanied by the creation 
of new socio-economic negatives.  It is well-established that the societal and economic 
costs to the taxpayers are $3 for every $1 in benefits. 
 These issues should first be examined from the strategic governmental 
perspective.  In this context, the inherently parasitic manner in which legalized gambling 
activities must apparently collect consumer dollars to survive is frequently described as 
“cannibalism” of the pre-existing economy—including the pre-existing tourist industry.  
According to the skeptics of legalized gambling activities, this industry-specific 
phenomenon means that in comparison with most other industries, legalized gambling 
activities must a fortiori not only grow as rapidly as possible, but also grow as 
expansively as possible.  John W. Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities: The Issues 
Involving Market Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 271-306 (1995).  See also John W. 
Kindt, The Negative Impacts of Legalized Gambling On Businesses 4 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 
93-124 (1994) (lead article). 
 In California and Nevada: Subsidy, Monopoly, and Competitive Effects of 
Legalized Gambling, the California Governor’s Office of Planning and Research 
highlighted in December of 1992 “the enormous subsidy that Californians provide to 
Nevada through their gambling patronage” and concluded that “Nevada derives an 
enormous competitive advantage from its monopoly on legal gambling.”  The report 
summarized that “[g]ambling by Californians pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into 
Nevada, and probably adds about $8.8 billion—and 196,000 jobs—to the Nevada 
economy, counting the secondary employment it generates” and that this was “a direct 
transfer of income and wealth form California to Nevada every year.”  Thus, the Nevada 
economy appears to constitute a classic example of a legalized gambling economy 
“parasitically” draining or “cannibalizing” another economy (primarily Southern 
California).  CAL. GOVERNOR’S OFF. PLAN & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA: 
SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES-1 (Dec. 
1992). 
 The gambling interests argue that the dollars they take in are “entertainment 
dollars” or “recreational dollars.”  This observation is valid with regard to approximately 
35% of the “gambling dollars,” but it is invalid with regard to the remaining 65%.  
Opponents of legalized gambling argue that there are also differences because the 
entertainment dollars spent on a movie, for example, largely generate more movies, and 
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recreation dollars spent on a speedboat, for example, largely generate orders for more 
speedboats.  Accordingly, while most entertainment or recreational dollars contribute to a 
positive multiplier effect legalized “gambling dollars” result in a net negative multiplier 
effect.  This negative impact apparently occurs, in part, because approximately two-thirds 
of the gambling dollars are not recreationally-oriented, but are spent by a compulsive 
market segment reacting to an addictive activity—probable or possible pathological 
gambling—as delimited by the American Psychiatric Association.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 615-18 § 312.31 
(4th ed. 1994).  Opponents also note that gambling dollars spent in a legalized gambling 
facility are usually reinvested in more gambling facilities—which just intensifies the 
socio-economic negatives associated with gambling activities and “reduces the national 
income” even further. 
 
5. Are Tribal Games and Slots “Fair” to Patrons? 
 
 Issues have arisen involving how “slot machines” are programmed and whether 
the astronomical odds are “fair” to patrons.  “The Insiders” for Gambling Lawsuits: Are 
the Games “Fair” and Will Casinos and Gambling Facilities be Easy Targets for 
Blueprints for RICO and Other Causes of Action?, 55 MERCER L. REV. 529-593 (2004) 
(lead article).  See also Subpoenaing Information from the Gambling Industry: Will the 
Discovery Process in Civil Lawsuits Reveal Hidden Violations Including the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?, 82 OREGON L. REV. 221-294 (2003) (lead 
article).  Coupled with pandemic regulatory failures, these issues of “fairness” have been 
exacerbated.  The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for 
Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U.L.J. 221-262 (2002) (lead article).  See also 
Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS OF THE AM. 
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOC. SCI.,85-97 (1998) (invited article). 
 The Office of the Inspector General reported in 1993 to the U.S. Department of 
the Interior (DOI) that 32 percent of Native American gambling operations were being 
conducted in violation of federal statutes/regulations.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, AUDIT REPORT: ISSUES IMPACTING IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (1993).  Thereafter, the National Indian 
Gaming Commission (NIGC) arguably suppressed numbers that indicated in November 
1996 that 84 percent of Native American gambling facilities were openly operating 
illegally or in violation of federal statutes/regulations.  NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, 
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE INDIAN GAMING 
REGULATORY ACT (Nov. 1996).  Other reports suggested that there were more than just 
isolated instances of crime and corruption caused by Native American gambling 
activities. 
 Furthermore, the implicit goals of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA) to enhance the lives of all Native Americans were not being realized, as the large 
majority of Native Americans remained in grinding poverty as the 21st century began.  
See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDIAN PROGRAMS: TRIBAL PRIORITY 
ALLOCATIONS DO NOT TARGET THE NEEDIEST TRIBES 1 (1998).  Accordingly, 
policymakers have suggested that future legislation should not disproportionately enrich 
isolated tribes.  Instead, Native American gambling should operate for the benefit of all 
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Native Americans, if not all of the U.S. public.  This could be achieved via federal 
administration of a Gambling Proceeds Trust Fund financed by Native American 
gambling operations while they are phased out to become educational and technological 
facilities. 
 In 2000 it was reported that “[d]espite an explosion of Indian gambling revenues-
from $100 million in 1988 to $8.26 billion a decade later [1998]-an Associated Press 
[AP] computer analysis of federal unemployment, poverty and  public-assistance records 
indicates the majority of American Indians have benefited little.”  Between 1988 and 
1998 “poverty and unemployment rates changed little,” as exemplified by the Fort 
Mojave Indian Reservation, where despite two casinos, the Native American 
“unemployment rate climbed from 27.2 percent in 1991 to 74.2 percent in 1997.”  This 
development was attributed to the fact that “among the 130 tribes with casinos, a few 
near major population centers have thrived while most others make just enough to cover 
the bills.”  In addition, any “new jobs [created by the Indian gambling facilities] have not 
reduced unemployment for Indians.”  David Pace, Casino Boom a Bust for Most 
Members of Indian Tribes, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Sept. 2, 2000, at A1.  
According to the National Indian Gaming Association, the lack of net new jobs for 
Indians was because “75 percent of jobs in tribal casinos are held by non-Indians.”   
Unexpectedly, the 55 tribes with casinos before 1992 had their 1991 unemployment rate 
of 54 percent even increase somewhat to 54.4 percent by 1997.  For an extensive 
investigative report highlighting the problems of Native American gambling activities, 
see Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele,  Look Who’s Cashing In At Indian Casinos: 
Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 14, 2002, at 44 (cover story). 
 These situations were exacerbated by illusory accounting standards that resulted 
in some tribal members with exorbitant wealth while most Native Americans remained 
disenfranchised.  The tribes also claimed to have sovereign immunity from general 
federal statutes like those involving labor rules, sexual harassment, equal employment 
opportunity, and tortious acts.  As reported in the Wall Street Journal and as most 
disconcerting to Congressional leaders were the indications involving alleged organized 
crime activities.  The concerns among the U.S. Representatives were exemplified by 
Representative Chris Shays (R-Conn.) and Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) who 
highlighted these in a letter to President Clinton. 
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Appendix: Business Economics of Licensed Organized Gambling 
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(Joe Camel to 
Joe Casino) 
Drive-by Business = -65% ~ 
100 Miles 
Feeder 
Market 
I. See National Gambling Impact & Po/icy Commission Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 
Before the House Comm. on the Jlldiciary, 1 04th Congo 367405 (1995); Earl L. Grinols, Bluff 
or Winning Hand? Riverboat Gambling and Regional Employment and Unemployment. iLL 
Bus. REV., Spring 1994, at 8, 8-11; see also Earl L. Gnnols, Gambling as Economic Policy: 
Enumerating Why Losses Exceed Gains, ILL. BUS. REv .. Sorimt 1995. at 6, 6-1l. 
Reprinted with pennissiol1 from : John W. Kindt, 
LJimillishing or Negaring The Multiplier Effect: The 
Transfo'l" a/Consumer Dollars to Legalized 
Gamblillg: Should a Negative Socia-Economic 
··Crime Mlill iplier " Be /nc/[(ded in Gambling 
Cost/Benefil Analyses? 2003 MICH. ST. DeL. REv. 
(2003). 
2003] The Transfer of Consumer Dollars /0 Legalized Gambling 313 
2. See FLA. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, CASINOS IN FLORIOA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TilE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS (1994); ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGAUZED 
GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 49 (1994); Earl L. Grinols & 
David B. Mustard, Business Profitability versus Social Profitabilily: Evaluating Jndr~stries with 
Exlemalilies. The Case ofCasilJos, 22 MANAGERIAL &. DECISIOS EcON. 143 (2001); see also 
John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts ofLegaliud Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 
51, 88-95, tbls.I-3 (1994) (hereinafter Kindt, Economic Impacts]; John Warren Kindt, The 
Business-Economic ["'pac(so/Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term Gain 
but Long Term Pain, 13 W. VA. PUB. AFF. REP. 22, 23-24 (1996). 
3. See supra nofe 1, 
4. See supra note 2, 
5. See, e .g., Earl L. Grinols et aI., C.asinos and Crime (1999). 
6. SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997 (1997); SMR 
RESEARCH CORP., THE NEW BANKRUPTCY EPIDEMIC FORECASTS, CAUSES, & RISK CONTROL 
(2001). 
7. William N. Thompson & Ricardo C. Gazel, The Monetary Impacls a/Riverboat 
Casino Gambling in llIinois (1996). 
8. WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., WIS. POL'y R ESEARCH INST., WISCONSIN POLICY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE REPORT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERlCAN GAMING TN 
WISCONSIN, APRIL 1995. 
9. HOWARD 1. SHAFFER ET AL, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, EsTIMATING TIlE 
PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBUNG BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A 
META-ANALYSIS, app. " (1997); Press Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical 
School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997) 
(From .84 percent in 1993 "the prevalence rate for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult 
population. "); see also Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 2, at 88-95, tbls.I-3 . 
10. See supra note 9. 
11. For the adolescent population, Dr. Durand Jacobs of the Lorna Linda University 
Medical School was reporting 4'%. to 6%. See Durand F. Jacobs, Illegal and Undocumented: 
A Review o/Teenage Gambling and the Plight o/Children o/Problem Gamblers in America, 
in COMPULSIVE GAMBUNG: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 249 (Howard J. Shaffer et al . 
cds., 1989). 
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Table 2. Annual Social Costs per Pathological Gambler 
MD FL 
Politzer Exec. 
el al. Office 
(1981 ) of Go\' 
($) (1994) 
($) 
Crime 
Apprehension and increased police costs 
Adjudicatio n (criminal and civil 1788 
justice costs) 
Inca ra: ralion and supervision costs 2828 1522 1 
Business and employment costs 11 265 
Lost productivity on job 
Lost time and unemployment 
Bankruptcy 
Suicide 
Illness 
Social service costs 
Therapy/treatment costs 
Unemploymen t and o ther soc. S\'C. 
(inc!. welfare and rood stamps) 
Government direct regulatory costs 
Fam11y costs 
Divorce, se paration 
Abused dollars 14354 
Reprinted with permission from: Earl L. Grinols 
& David O. Mustard, Business Profitability 
versus Social Profitability : Evaluation Industries 
with £ -..:tt:nralilies--The Case. o;fCasinos, 22 
MANAGERlAL & DEC. ECON 143 (2002) (John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. , Pub.). 
WI CT 
Thompson T hompson 
(', al. n 01. 
(1 996) (1998) 
($) ($) 
44 71 
12.14 994 
758 889 
2717 3436 
515 
437 114 
606 91 1 
3802 9519 
SD LA US 
SD leg. Ryan Gerstein 
Research ('f o/. t'l lIl. 
Council (1999) (1999\ 
/998-1999 (S) IS) 
($) 
1000 5) 
27 (149 
382 690 
59)6 320 
7()() 
15 396 30 
549 60 145 
240 3 175 
SC Row 
Thompson averages 
'lUd Quinn fo r studies 
(1999) 1994- 1999 
IS ) IS) 
11 6 '257 
-l76 670 
4 ~1 3065 
J(lg2 10$2 
:!I S6 2913 
11 8 3 16 
700 
83 189 
3 18 442 
111 111 
2436 3834 
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TABLE 18 Net Economic Impact ofIndian Casino Gambling in the Rest of Wisconsin 
Total Positive &onomic Impact 
Total Negative Economic Impact 
Net Economic Impact BeJore Social and InJrastructure Costs 
Low-Estimate Social Costs 
Median-Estimate Social Costs 
High-Estimate Social Costs 
$ Millions 
339.56 
-563.50 
-223.94 
94.67 
189.35 
269.45 
NET ECONOMIC IMPACT WITH WW SOCIAL COSTS -318_61 
.. NET ECONOMIC IMPACT WITH MEDIAN SOCIAL COSTS -413.29 
NET ECONOMIC IMPACT WITH HIGH SOCIAL COSTS -493.39 
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS 
39 
Thus far in our analysis. we have limited our consideration to direct and indirect economic 
impacts. both positive and negative. These impacts are susceptible to precise measurements. given that 
the factual data are accurate. Of course. because of limited access to such factual data. we have had to 
use estimates based on the best reasonable assumptions we have available to us. Nonetheless. we can use 
the precision of specific-dollar figures for these impacts. When we attempt to assess the economic 
impact of social benefits and social costs that necessarily attend the introduction of the gambling 
enterprise into any economy. we delve into a world of imprecision. However. the fact that much doubt 
surrounds the financial dollars that should be attached to these costs and benefits should in no way be 
used to deny their existence and imponance. We must address social benefits and costs and suggest how 
they may fit into the overall economic impact analysis that we are conducting. 
Social benefits include the creation of a new work ethic among previously unemployed persons. 
a spirit of self-sufficiency among previously dependent peoples. a variety of new programs supponed by 
revitalized tribal governments. These programs include housing. health. welfare. education. and 
economic development. On the negative side. the analysis musltake note of criminal activity that may be 
generated by the presence of casinos and also the costs of gambling addictions that result from the 
existence of the casinos. Our analysis of most of these areas ends with a textual description of activities 
and problems. Because there have been many studies of problem gambling. we have attempted to assign 
dollar figures to this problem area (high. medium. and low range). and we believe that these figures 
should be juxtaposed with the economic-impact figures we have calculated because they reflect a real 
cost to society. 
1. The benefits of investment and self-sufficiency 
The greatest value that gaming provides may be found in the degree of independence it allows 
tribal governments to have. Economic-development programs instituted through government policies 
have inevitably required tribes to have all their financial decisions cenified and ratified by Bureau of 
Indian Affairs personnel. These approvalS denied opponunities for risk-taking and also for gaining 
expenise that comes with exerCising financial responsibility. Gaming funds are more directly controlled 
by the tribes. A selective listing of many of the projects that have been funded with gaming revenues 
illustrates a marked growth in that expenise and the responsibility that will become a foundation for 
tribal self-sufficiency well into the future. 
Reprinted with permission frorn:WlLLlAM 
THOMPSON, RICARDO GAZEL, & DAN 
RICKMAN, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING IN WISCOCiSJN 
(Wis. Pol'y Res. lust. 1995). 
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~ Table 1. Percentage of Expenditures by Problem Gamblers for Selected Forms of Gambling by State/Provinces 
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A lberta British Columbia NO"a St;:otia Washington Louisiana Iowa New York Average 
Bingo ("/0) 43 .6 37.3 NIA 44 .6 NIA N/A 39.5 39 
Lotto W,,) l lJ lott o; 19.3 11.9 lotto; 14,3 scra Lc.:h 6. 2 lotto; 22.7 24 .2 daily game 17. 6 a ll lotto 24.4 instant 2l.9 lo tto; 36 14 IOllO; 20. 6 
instant scratch games quick draw instant-sc ratch 
C;!~ii\o (%) 37.2 loca l; 34.4 26 . i reson; 33 .1 table 41:1.7 55.0 ca rd/diu: " !A 38.4 ",b le 4 l.4 41.8 table games 
ca rd lJ i\:t! 
Slots (%) 19.0 N/A 8.9 N/A N;A !6. 1 N!A 14.7 
ViJt:o mach ine (0/,,) 46.9 N;A 50.8 239 37.8 N:A 74.6 46. 8 
All ga;nes (%) 32.3 22 .6 26.4 24.7 41.2 26.8 39.1 30.4 
llorses ("/,) 54.2 on and off 29.5 on-track N/A 25.9 52.7 on-track; 48.4 50.0 
(rack 84.9 off- Lrack 
Sports (%) 19.0 fr iends! 21.7 spans; 19.7 friends; N/A 18.9 pools; 82.7 62.6 43.9 50.0 
w-workers 15.2 pools bookies 
Pull tu bs (0,-;'.) 45., 20.9 N!A 35.2 N!A N/A KiA 
Raines (~/o) 10.5 11.I N!A NiA N!A N/A NiA 
All (%) 32.3 22.6 26.4 24.7 41.2 26.8 39.1 
S ourcc.~: Lesieur (1998, tilble); 'Measuring the Com of Pathologica l Gambling,' Auuress by Prof Henry R . Lesieur, IIlinuis Statc University, at the National Conference o n 
G ambling B~havior, N at ional Council on Problem Gambling, Chicago, Illin ois, 3- 5 September 1996 (table). 
N !A, not applicable. 
Added notes of Pro:essor Lesieur: 
Pathological gamblers sp~nd an inordinate amount of molley on gambling compar~d to others who gamble (Lesieur, 1998). For example, problem video lottery players in 1'\ova 
Scotia account for 4'1~ of those who play , yct l:ontrib uLe 53% of net revenue for video lottery playing (focal Research, 1998). The Australian ProduClivity COilunission (1999) 
es timated that problem gamblers account for 5.7% of mouey spent on lottery play, 10.1% of casino table game play, 19% of scratch tjcket salt:s, 33% of wagering on horses and 
dogs, and 42% of money spe:lt a n gaming machine play . Overa ll , problem gamblers expend 33% of a ll money spent on gambling in Auslralja. 
Fm:a! Research (1998j. 1997/1998l\'oVG S~'(Jl ia lo ttery p fayen;' survey . PreprlIed for Problem Gambling Services, ~O\'a Scotia Department of Health . Halifax, Nova Scoti a: 
Amhor. 
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TilE COSTS OF ADDICTED GAMBLERS 
Table A4*. Bankruptcy Costs**-Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers! 1994-1997 
Sucio-ecooomic costs category 
2 t % filed bankruptciesJ 
:> 20% (SMR rcsearch)4 
23~/n (Wis., Thompson)6 
2R% (Quebecl 
Costs per bankrurtcy7 (SMR) (WEFA: 
$33308)" 
I.ega! cosls& 
Court costs8 
Admin. costs') (Thompson: '100 low') 
> lfY'/a (projected to 15%) of total bankrllptcy 
cost<;IO of $40 billion per year!1 and 1.35 
million filings II per year 
Average cost 
$113640' (1995) 
S29650 (1997) 
$505 ~SI000 (1997) 
$418 ~ $837 (1997) 
$100 ? (1995) 
Pathological gamblers = 75% of total gamhlingJbankruptcy pTObleml~ 
Problem gamblers = 25% of total gambling/bankruptcy problem 12 
Annual Range: ? 
Total new bankruptcy costs due to pathological gamblers, 1994--1997: ? 
Average cost 
(aujusted2 to 
current $)H 
$29650 
5505 -, $1000 
$418~$837 
Population Total new 
creating new costs** 
problem (1998) 
45 
Note: Usually ignored by bankruptcy attorneys, it was historically required that anyone filing for bankruptcy indicate money 
and assets lost because of gambling during the year, including 'dates, names, and places, and the amounts of money, lost', 
11 USC Appendix, Hankruptcy Rules, Form 7, in I. ).,l"elson Rose, Gambling and the Law 46 (1986), 
'" Footnotes at end of this article, 
*'" Numbers may easily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers), of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the following formula example: 
Example: 
CPI Current Year 
$ Fonner Year x - $ Current Year 
CPT Former Year 
166.6 (1999) $4000()(]O (1983) x ------ - $6690763 (1999) 
99.6 (1983) 
Table AS*. Bankruptcy Costs**-Costs of 3.5 Million New Problem Gamblersl 1994-1997 
Socio-economic costs category Average cost A veragc cost 
(adjusted2 to 
current $)** 
Population Total new 
creating new costs" 
problem (1998) 
-----------------------------------
31% filed bankruptcies] (1(1'/0 Kindt Conservative NO.)4 
Costs per bankmptcy5 (SMR) (WEE-A: $33308)6 
[.ega! costs6 
COllrt costs? 
Admin. costs7 (Thompson: 'too low') 
:> 10% (projected to 15%) of total bankruptcy costs9 of 
$40 billion per year9" and 1.35 million filings" per year 
S40 066 (1995) 
$29650 (1997) 
$505 ~$lOOO (1997) 
$418~$837 (1997) 
$100 ., (1995) 
Pathological gamblers = 75% of total gambling/bankruptcy prohlem 1o 
Prob\cm gamblers = 25% of total gambling/bankrllptcy problem lO 
Annual Range: ? 
Tolal new bankruptcy costs due to pathological gamblers, 1994--1997: 
$29650 
S505 -+$1000 
S418~$837 
Note: Usually ignored by bankruptcy attorneys, it was historically required that anyone filing for bankmptcy indicate money 
and assets lost because of gambling during the year, including 'dates, names, and places, and the amounts of money. lost'. 
11 U.S.c. Appendix, Bankruptcy Rules. Form 7, in 1 Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law 46 (1986). 
" Footnotes at end or this Article. 
** Numbers may easily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the "Cons\J.ult;r Pril:c Imk" (All Urban Consllmcr-;)" of the 
U.S. Bureau of L1.bor Statistics at http://stats.hls_gov/ and utilizing the following fonnula example· 
CPI Current Year 
S Former Year >< = $ Current Year 
CPI Former Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
S40(]()OOO (1983) x $6690763 (1999) 
f)!)Ji (1983') 
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